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Objective. To evaluate whether participation in Medicare’s Acute Care Episode
(ACE) Demonstration Program—an early, small, voluntary episode-based payment
program—was associated with a change in expenditures or quality of care.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Medicare claims for patients who underwent cardiac
or orthopedic surgery from 2007 to 2012 at ACE or control hospitals.
Study Design. We used a difference-in-differences approach, matching on baseline
and pre-enrollment volume, risk-adjusted Medicare payments, and clinical outcomes
to identify controls.
Principal Findings. Participation in the ACE Demonstration was not significantly
associated with 30-day Medicare payments (for orthopedic surgery: $358 with 95
percent CI: $894, +$178; for cardiac surgery: +$514 with 95 percent CI: $1,517,
+$2,545), or 30-day mortality (for orthopedic surgery: 0.10 with 95 percent CI:
0.50, 0.31; for cardiac surgery:0.27 with 95 percent CI:1.25, 0.72). Program par-
ticipation was associated with a decrease in total 30-day post-acute care payments (for
cardiac surgery: $718; 95 percent CI: $1,431, $6; and for orthopedic surgery:
$591; 95 percent CI: $-$1,161,$22).
Conclusions. Participation inMedicare’s ACE Demonstration Program was not asso-
ciated with a change in 30-day episode-based Medicare payments or 30-day mortality
for cardiac or orthopedic surgery, but it was associated with lower total 30-day post-
acute care payments.
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The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have set ambitious
goals to replace fee-for-service payments with alternative payment models
(Burwell 2015). One such model is bundled payments, where a fixed payment
is provided for a longitudinal episode of care that may span several different





care settings and include multiple providers. Bundling payments around an
“episode” of care may incentivize providers to better coordinate care, improve
quality, and decrease costs. CMS currently has at least four active or proposed
bundled payment programs: the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
(BPCI) initiative for up to 48 medical and surgical conditions; the Comprehen-
sive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Model for hip and knee replacement;
the Oncology Care Model; and the recently proposed cardiac and orthopedic
bundled payment models (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015b,
c; Tsai et al. 2015; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016).
Despite enthusiasm for bundled payment, there is limited evidence sup-
porting its effectiveness in reducing costs or improving quality outcomes
(Hussey et al. 2012; Shih, Chen, and Nallamothu 2015). Hospitals participat-
ing in the ACE Demonstration—an early, small, voluntary episode-based
payment program—accepted discounted bundled payments from Medicare
for cardiovascular and orthopedic inpatient care from 2009 to 2012. We used
a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the impact of the ACE
Demonstration Program on Medicare expenditures and clinical outcomes for
cardiac and orthopedic surgery.
METHODS
ACE Demonstration Overview
The ACE Demonstration was a 3-year initiative to test the impact of bundled
payments for 28 cardiovascular and nine orthopedic inpatient services (Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2015a). It built on CMS’s earlier experiments
with bundled payments: the Cataract Surgery Alternate Payment
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Demonstration and the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Demonstration. In
the ACE Demonstration, participating organizations received discounted pay-
ments for Part A and Part B services provided during an inpatient stay (see
Table S1) and shared in any savings if they met requirements for quality report-
ing and monitoring (Calsyn and Emanuel 2014). Participating organizations
could elect to incentivize physicians through gainsharing. Medicare agreed to
share savings with participating beneficiaries, up to the amount of the annual
Part B premium (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2015a).
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services invited physician hospi-
tal organizations that met minimum volume thresholds (e.g., 100 bypass surg-
eries or 90 hip and knee replacements in 2007) and were located in Texas,
Oklahoma, Colorado, and NewMexico, to apply for the ACE Demonstration
in May 2008. CMS selected participants based on a number of factors, includ-
ing ongoing quality improvement efforts, strength of organizational infrastruc-
ture, and the proposed discount, which did not include disproportionate share
hospital (DSH) or indirect medical education (IME) payments. Participants
were announced in January 2009, and CMS launched the program in April
2009. The start date for participants was staggered from April 2009 through
November 2010 (Centers for Medicare &Medicaid Services 2015a).
Data Source and Study Population
We used data from the MedPAR (Medicare Analysis Provider and Review)
and Master Beneficiary Summary files from 2007 to 2012 to identify clinical
cohorts, identify patient risk factors, and calculate study outcomes. We used
the American Hospital Association Annual Survey to identify hospital
characteristics.
We included patients who underwent any of the cardiac or orthopedic
surgical procedures included in the ACE Demonstration (i.e., cardiac bypass
[CABG], cardiac valve surgery, or hip or knee replacement or revision)
(Table S2). We excluded patients who were under 65 years of age or older
than 99 years and patients who were not enrolled in both Medicare Part A
and Part B in the 6 months prior to the index admission and the 3 months
after discharge. To increase clinical homogeneity, we also excluded patients
who were nursing home residents prior to surgery. For patients who hadmulti-
ple admissions for the same procedure in a given year, we chose the first
admission in that year.
This study was approved by the University of Michigan Institutional
Review Board.
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Medicare Expenditures
Our primary spending outcome was total, 30-day episode payments, which
we defined as Medicare spending from admission up until 30 days after dis-
charge for any of several components of care: (1) index hospitalization (DRG
payments plus outlier payments); (2) rehospitalization (DRG payments plus
outlier payments); (3) physician services at any time during the episode; and
(4) post-acute care payments (home health, skilled nursing facility, inpatient
rehabilitation facility, and outpatient). Our other spending outcomes were
hospital payments and physician payments occurring during the index hospi-
talization. We chose these spending outcomes, because the ACE Demonstra-
tion bundled Part A and Part B payments during the index hospitalization
only.We price-standardizedMedicare payments to account for regional differ-
ences in prices, using a method that has been previously described (Gottlieb
et al. 2010), and adjusted for inflation such that the results are presented in
2012 dollars (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). We examined payments prior
to the discount that ACE Demonstration hospitals granted to CMS.
Outcome Measures
Our main quality outcomes were mortality within 30 days of the index surgi-
cal procedure, serious complications, and 30-day readmissions. We used pre-
viously validated algorithms to identify eight common postoperative
complications (i.e., pulmonary failure, pneumonia, myocardial infarction,
deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, acute renal failure, post-
operative hemorrhage, surgical site infection, and gastrointestinal hemor-
rhage) with claims data (Table S3) (Iezzoni et al. 1994; Weingart et al. 2000).
Similar to prior work, we defined serious complications as any complication
accompanied by a length of stay greater than the 75th percentile for the proce-
dure (Osborne et al. 2015). We defined 30-day readmissions as any admission
to an acute care hospital that occurred within 30 days of discharge, excluding
transfers. The 30-day time frame has been adopted as the standard time frame
in quality improvement efforts around readmissions (Tsai et al. 2013).
Statistical Analyses
We used difference-in-differences analyses to compare the change in episode
payments and clinical outcomes before versus after enrollment in the ACE
Demonstration, compared with control hospitals. To select controls that
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resembled ACE hospitals as closely as possible, we used stratified exact
matching (as described in the Methods Appendix and Table S4) to identify
control hospitals as participating hospitals. We used multivariate models to
adjust for potential confounders not included in the exact matching.
We compared the patient and hospital characteristics of ACE versus con-
trol hospitals, before and after stratified exact matching to check the balance
(Table 1a,b). For each payment and clinical outcome, we also confirmed similar
pre-enrollment trends in ACE and control hospitals (Dimick and Ryan 2014).
We next performed the difference-in-differences analyses. We used multi-
variate generalized linear models with log link to estimate episode payments
before and after participation. ACE hospitals had exactly 2 years in the pre-
intervention time period, and the postintervention time period. For our three
dichotomous clinical outcomes, we used multivariate logistic regression mod-
els. We adjusted our models for patient risk factors, including age (continuous),
gender, race (black vs. white), and 29 Elixhauser comorbidities (Elixhauser
et al. 1998). We also adjusted our models for hospital characteristics that we
hypothesized were most likely to be associated with outcomes (i.e., number of
beds: <250, 250–499, ≥500; profit status: for-profit, nonprofit; teaching status;
and geographic region: Midwest, Northeast, South, and West), when not able
to perform an exact match on these characteristics. To account for secular
trends over time in payments and clinical outcomes, we also adjusted for year
of the procedure. All of our models included an interaction term (ACE 9 After
ACE implementation], with the coefficient for this interaction term being the
difference-in-differences estimator. In our primary analyses, we accounted for
clustering at the hospital level with robust standard errors. We performed two
additional sensitivity analyses: first accounting for clustering at the propensity
score strata level and then not accounting for any clustering.
p-values <.05 were considered to be statistically significant. All analyses
were conducted in Stata version 12.0 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX, USA).
RESULTS
During the study period, a total of 5,017 patients underwent cardiac surgery at
the four hospitals that enrolled in the ACE Demonstration for these procedures
(Table S1). These participating hospitals were matched with nine control hospi-
tals that cared for 9,617 cardiac surgery patients. For orthopedic surgery, a total
of 10,462 patients underwent hip or knee replacement or revision at the five hos-
pitals that enrolled in the ACE Demonstration for orthopedics. These
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Table 1: Characteristics of Hospitals Participating in the ACE Demonstra-




p-valueBefore Matching After Matching
(a)
Cardiac surgery
No. of hospitals 4 1,116 9





260 (169–478) 184 (110–307) 236 (212–292) .46
Profit status, %
For-profit 77 10 12 .02
Nonprofit 23 82 88
Other 0 8 0
Number of beds, %
<250 39 16 9 .96
250–499 23 42 48
≥500 37 42 44
Geographic region, %
Northeast 0 21 0 .33
West 25 16 33
Midwest 0 25 14
South 75 38 53
Other characteristics, median (IQR)




Urban, % 100 94 100
Nurse ratio 8 (5–10) 7 (6–9) 8 (6–9) .63






















Operating rooms 24 (5–52) 21 (14–33) 26 (22–49) .96
(b)
Orthopedic surgery
No. of hospitals 5 2,959 22
No. of patients 10,462 2,643,304 42,312
Continued
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participating hospitals were matched with 22 control hospitals that cared for
42,312 patients who underwent one of these procedures during the study period.
Compared with controls, hospitals participating in the ACE Demonstra-
tion for cardiac procedures were more likely to be smaller (39 percent vs. 9
percent with <250 beds), for-profit (77 percent vs. 12 percent), and non-teach-
ing hospitals (100 percent vs. 71 percent), but except for profit status, these dif-










1,152 (249–1,152) 335 (183–585) 459 (382–643) .97
Profit status, %
For-profit 98 10 10 <.001
Nonprofit 2 80 90
Other 0 9 0
Number of beds, %
<250 17 40 29 .05
250–499 2 37 45
≥500 81 23 26
Geographic region, %
Northeast 0 18 16 .10
West 17 18 19
Midwest 0 28 44
South 83 36 21
Other characteristics, median (IQR)
Nonteaching, % 100 82 84 .16
Technology
hospital, %
95 78 90 .08
Urban, % 100 92 88 .16
Nurse ratio 5 (5–6) 7 (6–9) 7 (6–9) .83






















Operating rooms 52 (19–60) 14 (9–24) 18 (14–23) .61
ACE, acute care episode; FTE, full-time equivalent employees; Operations/y, total annual surgi-
cal operations.
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hospitals had fewer full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees (1,416 vs. 1,824),
and fewer operations per year (11,495 vs. 13,390), but these differences also
were not statistically significant (Table 1). Results were similar for orthopedic
surgery, except that orthopedic ACE hospitals were more likely to be larger
(81 percent vs. 26 percent with 500+ beds), have more FTE employees, and
perform more operations (29,316 vs. 11,213) compared with non-ACE hospi-
tals. However, these differences were not statistically significant.
The characteristics of patients at ACE hospitals also differed from the
characteristics of patients seen at control hospitals (Tables S5, S6, and S7).
Compared with controls, hospitals participating in the ACE Demonstration
for cardiac procedures had slightly younger patients (74.1 vs. 74.5 years; p-
value <.01), and a higher proportion of white patients (90 percent vs. 89 per-
cent; p-value <.01). Compared with controls, hospitals participating in the
ACE Demonstration for orthopedic procedures had a lower proportion of
white patients (88 percent vs. 95 percent; p-value <.01) and were more likely
to care for patients with at least two comorbidities (72 percent vs. 61 percent;
p-value <.01). For both cardiac and orthopedic procedures, the proportion of
Figure 1: Cost and Quality before versus after Participating in the ACE
Demonstration Compared with Matched Non-ACE Control Hospitals [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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patients with individual comorbidities at ACE and control hospitals did not
differ in clinically meaningful ways.
There were parallel pre-intervention trends in cost and quality outcomes
at ACE hospitals and matched controls (Figure 1). For example, total 30-day
episode payments for cardiac surgery decreased from $45,558 to $43,820 at
ACE hospitals during the pre-intervention period, and from $47,057 to
$45,524 at control hospitals during this same time period (p-value = .21).
There were also parallel trends for other cost and quality outcomes. Similarly,
total 30-day episode payments for orthopedic surgery showed minimal
change at ACE hospitals during the pre-intervention period ($22,111 to
$21,707), and little change at control hospitals during this same time period
($22,251 to $21,940) (p-value = .32). Trends at ACE hospitals also mirrored
trends at control hospitals for other cost and quality outcomes.
In difference-in-differences analyses, there were no statistically significant
changes in total, price-standardized, 30-day episode payments for cardiac sur-
gery at ACE Demonstration hospitals compared with controls, in the postinter-
vention versus pre-intervention periods ($514; 95 percent CI: $1,517 to
$2,545) (Table 2). Similarly, program participation was not associated with any
change in payments for the index hospitalization ($862; 95 percent CI: $396
to $2,120) or inpatient physician care after cardiac surgery ($20; 95 percent CI:
$423 to $463). Results were similar for payment outcomes for orthopedic
surgery. However, program participation was associated with a decrease in total
post-acute care payments (for cardiac surgery: $718; 95 percent CI: $1,431,
$6; and for orthopedic surgery: $591; 95 percent CI: $-$1,161, $22).
With regard to clinical outcomes, participation in the ACE Demonstra-
tion was not associated with any statistically significant changes in 30-day
mortality after cardiac surgery (0.27; 95 percent CI:1.25 to 0.72) (Table 3).
Program participation also was not associated with any statistically significant
changes in readmissions (0.21; 95 percent CI: 1.67 to 2.09) or serious com-
plications after cardiac surgery (0.81; 95 percent CI: 1.80 to 3.42). Results
were similar for orthopedic surgery, except ACE hospitals had a statistically
significant decrease in readmission rates compared with controls (2.22; 95
percent CI:3.25 to1.19).
DISCUSSION
We found that participation in the ACE Demonstration Program for cardiac
and orthopedic surgery was not associated with a reduction in total 30-day
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Table 2: Thirty-Day Total and Component Episode Payment Outcomes
before versus after Participating in the ACE Demonstration Compared with
Matched Non-ACE (Control) Hospitals
Cost Outcome, by Procedure
Marginal Predicted Payments, $s
Difference in Average Medicare






Home health (N = 5,095)
ACE 1,584 1,637 16 (196, 229)
Non-ACE 1,780 1,816
Skilled nursing facility (N = 2,020)
ACE 8,422 10,166 1,013 (154, 2,180)
Non-ACE 7,063 7,817
Inpatient rehabilitation (N = 144)
ACE 22,262 29,129 5,234 (3,868, 14,336)
Non-ACE 13,662 14,615
Other PAC (N = 5,755)
ACE 2,103 1,481 684 (1,733, 364)
Non-ACE 4,031 4,182
Total PAC (N = 8,128)
ACE 4,772 4,363 718 (1,431,6)
Non-ACE 5,429 5,772
Index admission (N = 10,667)
ACE 31,144 31,556 862 (396, 2,120)
Non-ACE 34,666 34,231
Physician (N = 10,860)
ACE 4,339 4,489 20 (423, 463)
Non-ACE 5,987 6,187
Total episode (N = 9,735)




Home health (N = 10,375)
ACE 2,703 2,840 6 (288, 300)
Non-ACE 2,804 2,938
Skilled nursing facility (N = 7,377)
ACE 7,804 8,189 204 (737, 330)
Non-ACE 9,490 10,077
Inpatient rehabilitation (N = 652)
ACE 14,495 15,527 410 (1,656, 837)
Non-ACE 12,771 14,371
Continued
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episode payments, hospital payments, or physician payments during the
index hospitalization. However, it was associated with a reduction in total 30-
day, post-acute care payments. Participation in the ACE Demonstration was
not associated with a consistent improvement in clinical outcomes.
Our study adds to existing literature on bundled payments by evaluating
the ACE Demonstration using intervention and control hospitals that have
parallel pre-intervention trends, one of the major assumptions of the differ-
ence-in-differences approach for policy evaluation (Dimick and Ryan 2014).
A prior evaluation of the ACE did not explicitly confirm parallel pre-interven-
tion trends for ACE and non-ACE hospitals for all analyses (IMPAQ Interna-
tional and The Hilltop Institute 2013). With our approach, we found no
association between participation in the ACE Demonstration and total 30-day
episode spending or most clinical outcomes. However, program participation
was associated with lower total 30-day, post-acute care spending.
Our findings should be interpreted in the context of earlier evidence in
support of “bundling” health care payments. The Inpatient Prospective Pay-
ment System (IPPS) bundled payments for hospital care excluding physician
services, reimbursing hospitals a fixed payment per admission based on a
patient’s diagnosis. The IPPS dramatically reduced length of stay but did not
Table 2 Continued
Cost Outcome, by Procedure
Marginal Predicted Payments, $s
Difference in Average Medicare




Other PAC (N = 8,147)
ACE 3,555 4,367 154 (1,298, 991)
Non-ACE 4,416 5,404
Total PAC (N = 17,641)
ACE 8,595 7,904 591 (1,161,22)
Non-ACE 8,069 7,987
Index admission (N = 23,706)
ACE 11,445 11,864 1 (88, 86)
Non-ACE 11,490 11,908
Physician (N = 18,213)
ACE 2,068 2,104 8 (80, 96)
Non-ACE 2,210 2,237
Total episode (N = 19,680)
ACE 22,501 22,413 358 (894, 178)
Non-ACE 21,705 21,899
ACE, acute care episode; CI, confidence interval; PAC, post-acute care.
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adversely affect mortality or readmission rates (Lave 1989; Kahn et al. 1990;
Chulis 1991; Feinglass and Holloway 1991). Research also suggests that the
Medicare Heart Bypass Demonstration—which bundled inpatient hospital
and physician payments and readmissions for seven hospitals—reduced
Medicare spending primarily through discounted payments but also through
decreases in postdischarge care (Cromwell et al. 1998).
There may be several reasons why the ACE Demonstration did not suc-
ceed in reducing total 30-day episode payments. It is possible that incentives were
not large enough for providers to fully engage in the initiative. Hospitals negoti-
ated their own discounts withMedicare, but not all hospitals engaged in gainshar-
ing with physicians (IMPAQ International and The Hilltop Institute 2013).
Recent attempts at bundled payments also make clear that there are substantial
barriers to implementation, such as lack of advanced information technology as
well as lack of establishedmechanisms to distribute physician payments (Hussey,
Table 3: Thirty-Day Total and Component Quality Outcomes before versus
after Participating in the ACE Demonstration Compared with Matched Non-
ACE (Control) Hospitals
Quality Outcome, by Procedure
Marginal Predicted Rate of
Outcomes
Difference in Rates of Adverse
Outcomes after vs. before the ACE
Demonstration, Compared with
Control Hospitals (95% CI)Pre-enrollment Postenrollment
Cardiac surgery
Serious complications (N = 14,634)
ACE 9.29 12.55 0.81 (1.8, 3.42)
Non-ACE 10.76 14.28
Readmissions (N = 23,423)
ACE 15.29 16.42 0.21 (1.67, 2.09)
Non-ACE 16.7 17.53
Mortality (N = 26,675)
ACE 1.77 2.03 0.27 (1.25, 0.72)
Non-ACE 4.37 4.65
Orthopedic surgery
Serious complications (N = 52,774)
ACE 3.85 2.65 1.14 (2.33, 0.04)
Non-ACE 4.37 3.81
Readmissions (N = 43,046)
ACE 9.94 7.96 2.22 (3.25,1.19)
Non-ACE 11.48 11.61
Mortality (N = 37,645)
ACE 1.66 1.37 0.1 (0.5, 0.31)
Non-ACE 1.72 1.48
ACE, acute care episode; CI, confidence interval.
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Ridgely, and Rosenthal 2011; Ridgely et al. 2014). Our findings, in conjunction
with the fact that payments to physicians make up a small proportion of total epi-
sode payments for surgery (Birkmeyer et al. 2010; Miller et al. 2011), should
temper enthusiasm for an inpatient-only bundle. However, they leave open the
possibility that more inclusive bundles may have a larger impact on utilization
and quality of care. Early evidence suggests that a broad bundle for lower extrem-
ity joint replacement can lower total episode spending (Dummit et al. 2016).
Even though the ACE Demonstration only bundled inpatient payments,
we found that total 30-day post-acute care payments were lower for ACE versus
non-ACE hospitals. This was surprising. It could be that ACE hospitals were
more involved in non-ACE initiatives that bundled payments over a longer time
period. CMS’ criteria for selecting participating organizations included the pres-
ence of strong organizational infrastructure and experience with quality
improvement activities (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2015a). It
may also be that efforts to increase inpatient efficiencies for the ACE Demon-
stration fostered a culture of “value” that affected discharge decisions (e.g., fewer
discharges to post-acute care facilities when those services were believed to be
unnecessary). We did not have the qualitative data to explore these hypotheses.
Our study had several potential limitations. First, our primary goal was
to assess how participation in the ACE Demonstration affected both utilization
within an episode of care and quality of care. Therefore, we cannot make any
conclusions about the ACE Demonstration’s impact on either hospitals’ costs
of care or actual payments disbursed by Medicare. Second, because we per-
formed a quasi-experimental study of a voluntary program, our results may be
biased by selection. Although we matched hospitals on outcomes at baseline,
pre-intervention year 1, and pre-intervention year 2, differences still remained
after matching, most notably with profit status. We also compared each hospi-
tal both to itself in a pre-/post-comparison and to controls. Third, as the num-
ber of hospitals participating in the ACE Demonstration was very small (four
for cardiac surgery and five for orthopedic surgery), we did not have the
power to detect small differences in utilization or clinical outcomes. Finally,
we did not have complete information about participation in other value-based
purchasing programs, which may have provided additional incentives for
lower episode payments. In the few areas where the ACE Demonstration was
associated with lower utilization (i.e., total post-acute care payments and read-
missions), we cannot rule out the possibility that the effects may in part have
been due to participation in non-ACE value-based purchasing programs.
In spite of these limitations, it is worth considering the implications of
our results for the current expansion of episode-based payment models
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(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015b; Kline et al. 2015). First,
our results suggest that the limited scope of some of the BPCI models may
limit their effectiveness (e.g., Model 1, which bundles Part A and Part B pay-
ments during the inpatient stay, like the ACE Demonstration; Model 3, which
bundles post-acute care alone; and Model 4, which bundles the index admis-
sion and any readmissions) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2014).
Second, the magnitude of the incentives in the evolving CJR and Oncology
Care Models may need to be larger than those extended to ACE hospitals in
order to have a larger impact on utilization and quality.
Bundled payment is alternative to fee-for-service that is increasingly
being considered by payers. Nonetheless, we cannot assume that it will
improve value. To be effective, bundled payment must ultimately incentivize
lower utilization. Our results suggest that the ACE Demonstration—evaluate
small, voluntary, early bundled payment program—was associated with lower
total 30-day post-acute care utilization. It would be important to assess
whether broader bundles with more participants—such as those that have
been implemented or proposed by CMS—have similar or larger effects for a
broad range of conditions. Medicare may initially save money through bun-
dled payment programs that incorporate discounted episode payments to pro-
viders (e.g., BPCI), but discounted episode payments amount to the same
thing as rate cuts. Research must strive to understand the designs of bundled
payment programs that can improve value over the long term by lowering uti-
lization without compromising quality.
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